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What's Ahead for Venezuela: Interview with Daniel Hellinger
By Megan Morrissey
Venezuela Information Office
January 22, 2009
Megan Morrissey: What is your assessment of the strength of democracy in Venezuela today? Is it better or worse now than a decade ago, before President Chavez was elected?
Daniel Hellinger: It is difficult to answer this question with a simple "It's better or worse" response. There is no doubt in my mind that Venezuela is a more democratic place today that it was before December 1998. The Bolivarian Constitution was a major step forward in terms of democratic innovation and empowerment of citizens. Anti-poverty programs and programs to foster endogenous development have fostered "inclusion," a wide-spread sense among the majority poor that they are now empowered. And at the grassroots level, vigorous debates and innovative participatory practices have appeared, many of which have received little attention outside Venezuela. Community media are a good example here.
On the other hand, Venezuela lacks a responsible opposition. When it comes to the parties aligned against the government, this is hardly the fault of President Chávez. However, the lack of autonomous mechanisms within chavismo to hold government accountable is, in part, attributable to failures in leadership by Hugo Chávez. The dependency of the chavista movement on the charismatic leadership of the president indicates that the participatory and protagonistic character of the Bolivarian Constitution exists too much on paper, not enough in reality.
President Chávez might attribute this shortcoming to the defeat of the constitutional amendment packages in December 2007, but the Bolivarian Constitution of 1999 provides for many innovative participatory practices that have not been fully utilized. As for the community councils, they seem to be working best in parts of the country where there are previous experiences with participatory local governance or where innovative leaders, such as Julio Chávez in the state of Lara, have stimulated initiatives from below. However, in other cases the councils have been instituted from above and provided the basis for new patronage networks to evolve, short-circuiting well-intentioned plans to shift resources from venal politicians to the people.
I also see a weakness in the failure of the judicial system and the pro-Chávez media to function in a way that gives voice to those frustrated with the corruption and inefficiency within the government and the chavista movement. As people do not want to weaken the Revolution by taking complaints to the mainstream opposition media, this leaves them frustrated and even more likely to express their concerns through abstention or even voting for the opposition. And as for the courts, the prevailing practice seems to follow the rule expressed popularly in Mexico as, “For my friends, everything; for my enemies, the law.” That is, while prosecutions of important opposition leaders may in fact be grounded in law, they will seem selective as long as only opposition leaders are brought to justice.
MM: It seems sometimes that Washington’s rigid definition of liberal democracy as the only “true” form of democracy is the source of much misunderstanding and much prejudice about Venezuela. What do you think people ought to know in order to better understand what is unique about Venezuela’s system of government?
DH: The prejudiced reporting of the mainstream media in the U.S. means that people are unaware of just how well Venezuelan democracy fares when judged by conventional criteria, such as free speech, fair elections, etc. In fact, it is too easy to lose sight of how amazing it has been that Venezuelans were able to settle the question of Chávez’s legitimacy through the recall election of 2004. And now matter how often we bring it up, few people outside of Venezuela seem to be aware how often Venezuelans have gone to polls to choose leaders or vote on important issues.
I think there is much to learn from the Venezuelan experience with participatory democracy in places such as Carora, where one can see the best practices associated with Venezuela’s more participatory democracy. For example, we have severe problems in our cities. If the mayor of Carora can trust people in local assemblies to decide on priorities for spending half the municipal budget, at so far it seems to have worked, why can’t we trust people in Detroit, Washington, or St. Louis to do the same?
MM: What were your impressions of the state and municipal elections on November 23rd? Do you think the results change the balance of power at all between the PUSV and opposition parties? What do the results mean?
DH: The good news for the PSUV was that it showed a capacity to mobilize voters, something in doubt after the defeat of the reform packages in December 2007. The opposition has pretty consistently gotten between 4.1 and 4.3 million votes nationally in each the last four national elections. So the capacity of chavismo to prevail nationally seems to depend on turning out at least that number. The PSUV actually turned out well over 5 million voters.
Having said that, there is no doubt that PSUV losses in Zulia (including Maracaibo), in Carabobo, and in much of Caracas area in strategic terms poses serious problems for chavismo. It will make harder the deployment of the new national police force, for example. It also concerns me that some of the high-profile chavista politicians who lost were awarded cabinet posts shortly afterwards. It shows the president’s loyalty to his allies, but it loyalty is not always a virtue.
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NOTE: The Venezuela Information Office is dedicated to informing the American
public about contemporary Venezuela, and receives its funding from the
government of Venezuela. More information is available from the FARA office
of the Department of Justice in Washington DC.
Venezuela Information Office
2000 P Street NW, Suite 240
Washington, DC 20036
tel: (202) 347-8081
fax: (202) 223-8029
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