Judicial Reform in Venezuela

 

 

 

 

 

The recent passage of a new Supreme Court law, and subsequent international response, has drawn attention to the process of judicial reform in Venezuela. Some recent commentary in the U.S. would suggest that the problems of the Venezuelan judiciary are 1) new; 2) worse under the Chávez government than under its predecessors; 3) the product of a failure by the Chávez government to meaningfully address these issues; 4) or an attempt to subjugate the courts to the executive branch. These assumptions fail to stand up to scrutiny.

 

Judicial Reform: Background

 

It is widely recognized that Venezuela’s judicial system had very low credibility prior to the Chávez government.  In a recent report, Human Rights Watch (HRW) notes that “When President Chávez became president in 1999, he inherited a judiciary that had been plagued for years by influence-peddling, political interference, and, above all, corruption...In terms of public credibility, the system was bankrupt.”[1] HRW points out that most Venezuelan judges have been appointed on either a temporary or provisional basis and thus lack in independence. The report notes that Venezuelan officials recognize this: “Venezuelan justice officials, judges and jurists of all political stripes also acknowledge the problem…[T]he Supreme Court president, other Supreme Court justices, the attorney general, the ombudsman, and current and former judges all conceded that the prevalence of provisional and temporary appointments undermines judicial independence.”[2] The report further notes that the situation was not appreciably better before the Chávez government, despite the misleading representations by the opposition.  In 1997 only 40% of judges held permanent appointments.[3]

 

Accomplishments of Judicial Reform under the Chávez Administration

 

Since taking office the Chávez Administration has attempted to address these problems. In its recent report, HRW acknowledges that “the judiciary has opened new courts in an effort to increase access to justice.”[4]

 

In 2002, Inter-American Development Bank's (IDB) magazine noted that the 1999 judicial reform streamlined sentencing and strengthened defendants' rights.  When President Chávez took office, 75 percent of prisoners in Venezuela had not yet been sentenced.  Three years later, less than 43 percent of prisoners had not yet been sentenced. Caracas law professor Gonzalo Himiob Santomé, a consultant of the IDB in Venezuela, noted that previously a suspect could be arrested and held for 16 days before charges were brought against him. “Now a suspect must be called before a judge within 48 hours.”[5]

 

In December 2003, the World Bank reported that “The [judicial] reform effort has made significant progress – the STJ [Supreme Court] is more modern and efficient.” It further noted that the “overall clearance rate[6] increased by about 30-40 percent in 1997 – 2002. Also, its decision publications which took 7 years are now available immediately via Internet, and its management of lower courts has improved...[For example,] average duration of cases from filing to disposition in collection of money disputes in civil courts... has declined from 790 days to 237 days...”[7]

 

The New Supreme Court Law

 

The new Supreme Court law allows the National Assembly to appoint the new judges with a simple majority instead of a two-thirds majority, when the legislature has failed to achieve a two-thirds majority after three attempts. Approval by a simple majority is not unusual by international standards – a simple majority of the Senate is required to confirm a nominee to the U.S. Supreme Court. Article 264[8] of Venezuela’s Constitution states: “The magistrates of the Supreme Tribunal of Justice will be chosen for a single twelve year term. The law will determine the procedure for their election.” The new law also allows the government to increase the size of the court from 20 to 32. The Constitution does not specify how many judges should preside over the Supreme Court. Legislators supporting the new law argue that the current number of judges is insufficient for the caseload of the court; unlike the U.S. Supreme Court, the full Court does not preside over every case, so increasing the number of judges increases the Court’s capacity.

 

HRW and others claim[9] that the new Supreme Court law, as an “organic law,” requires a 2/3 majority to pass the legislature. However, the Constitution’s Article 203, which HRW cites, says that a two-thirds majority is required of those present to begin discussing the law, not that a two-thirds majority of all Assembly members is required to pass the law. The law reads as follows: “Any organic law project, except those that this constitution qualifies as such, will be previously admitted by the National Assembly by a two-thirds vote of the members present before beginning discussion of the respective law project.”

 

The new law says that a judge who is accused by the public prosecutor of wrongdoing will be suspended until the judge’s impeachment trial is completed. However, under Venezuela’s Constitution, the prosecutor’s office is independent of the executive. The executive plays no role in accusing judges of wrongdoing; also, it plays no role in adjudicating the issue, since this task belongs to the legislature.

 

The new law allows that the appointment of judges who falsified their resume in order to meet the requirements for a Supreme Court appointment may be nullified by the legislature. It is reasonable that an appointment should be “nullified” if it was obtained under false pretenses.

 

However, the new law also allows an appointment to be nullified if the Justice’s “public attitude . . . undermines the majesty or prestige of the Supreme Court” or of any of its members, or if the Justice “undermines the functioning” of the judiciary. The vagueness of these provisions has been widely criticized.[10] It is quite possible that Venezuela’s Supreme Court, which is required by the constitution to automatically verify the constitutionality of the Supreme Court law, will invalidate these provisions. Indeed, the Court has often invalidated laws passed supported by the Chavez Administration in the past.

 

Failure to Allow Prosecution of Coup Leaders

 

Some might wonder what reasonable argument Venezuelan legislators might have for wanting to replace some members of the Supreme Court. In 2002, the Supreme Court did not allow the prosecution of people who led a military coup against the elected government. It is reasonable for legislators to consider this an impeachable offense. Indeed, failure to allow prosecution of coup leaders constitutes a major threat to the rule of law, and indicates to some that the Court is already politicized, in favor of the opposition.

 

U.S. Precedents on Judicial Impeachment

 

In 1970, Republican Congressman Gerald Ford called for impeachment, under the provisions allowed by the U.S. Constitution, of a U.S. Supreme Court Justice. Rep. Ford stated: “... an impeachable offense is whatever a majority of the House of Representatives considers it to be at a given moment in history; conviction results from whatever offense ... two-thirds of the other body considers to be sufficiently serious to require removal of the accused from office.”[11]

 

Prior to the impeachment of President Clinton, the House of Representatives had impeached 15 individuals, including a president, 12 judges, a senator, and a Cabinet member. The Senate convicted 7 of the 15.[12] National Lawyers Guild National Vice President Nathan Newman noted that “Most were impeached for acts of personal impropriety but a number of others have been impeached strictly for their official conduct. The early history of the Republic saw a number of politically-charged judicial impeachments…It is relatively clear that the framers of the Constitution saw impeachment as an important political check on the judicial branch.”[13]

 

William Taft, who served as both Chief Justice of the Supreme Court and President of the United States, said in remarks made to the American Bar Association: “Under the authoritative construction by the highest court of impeachment, the Senate of the United States, a high misdemeanor for which a judge may be removed is misconduct involving bad faith … or recklessness in his judicial actions, or in the use of his official influence for ulterior purposes. By the liberal interpretation of the term "high misdemeanor" which the Senate has given there is now no difficulty in securing the removal of a judge for any reason that shows him unfit.”[14]

 


Conclusion

 

While some fair criticisms can be made of judicial reform in Venezuela and of the new Supreme Court law, it should be recognized that the problems of the judicial system predate the Chavez Administration. This Administration has made significant progress towards improving the judicial system in Venezuela, and most of the provisions of the new Supreme Court law are not fundamentally different from comparable U.S. law. As the above-cited reports indicate, both the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank have constructive relationships with the Venezuelan government in the area of judicial reform. The U.S. government and international human rights organizations are more likely to assist positive reforms of the judicial system in Venezuela by working constructively with the government, than by adopting rhetoric that positions them with the most confrontational elements of the Venezuelan opposition.

 

 



[1] Human Rights Watch, “Rigging the Rule of Law: Judicial Independence Under Siege in Venezuela,” June 2004, p. 7, http://www.hrw.org/reports/2004/venezuela0604/.

[2] Ibid, p. 10

[3] Ibid, p. 10

[4] Ibid, p. 11

[5] Daniel Drosdoff, “Prompt justice: Venezuela undertakes a sweeping reform of its courts,” IDBAmérica, March 2002, http://www.iadb.org/idbamerica/English/MAR02E/mar02e2.html

[6] Clearance rate is the ratio of resolved cases over filed.

[7] World Bank, Project Information Document, Report AB510, December 9, 2003, http://www-wds.worldbank.org/servlet/WDS_IBank_Servlet?pcont=details&eid=000104615_20040226144554.

[8] The Constitution can be viewed at http://www.venezuela.gov.ve/constitucion.asp. An unofficial English translation can be viewed at http://www.embavenez-us.org/constitution/intro.htm.

[9] HRW, op cit, p. 17

[10] Including by analysts usually considered sympathetic to the government. See for example, Gregory Wilpert, “Has Human Rights Watch Joined Venezuela’s Opposition?” Venezuelanalysis.com, http://www.venezuelanalysis.com/articles.php?artno=1200. Wilpert suggests that these particular provisions should require a two-thirds majority.

[11] House Floor Speech: Impeach Justice Douglas, Box D29, Gerald R. Ford Congressional Papers, Gerald R. Ford Library, p.6. http://www.ford.utexas.edu/library/speeches/700415a.htm.

[12] Jason J. Vicente, “Impeachment: A Constitutional Primer,” Cato Institute, September 18, 1998, www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa-318.pdf.

[13] Nathan Newman, “The Case for Impeaching the Rehnquist Five,” http://www.budgetsim.org/other/ImpeachSC.html.

[14] Cited in Steven W. Fitschen, “Impeaching Federal Judges: A Covenantal And Constitutional Response To Judicial Tyranny,” Regent University Law Review, Spring 1998 Volume 10, Number 1.