
Venezuelan Opposition Announces Platform
For Post-Chávez Transition, Financed By The
National Endowment For Democracy
“…it is clear that NED,
Department of Defense (DOD), and other U.S. assistance programs provided
training, institution building, and other support to individuals and
organizations understood to be actively involved in the brief ouster of the
Chávez government…”
--United States Department
of State, Office of Inspector General, “A Review of U.S. Policy Toward
Venezuela”[1]
According to documents obtained through the Freedom of Information Act,[2] the electoral platform of the Venezuelan opposition’s Democratic Coordinator, comprised of groups which have “…come together under an umbrella organization … in order to consolidate opposition to the Chávez government,”[3] appears to have been created with the help of funding from the United States. Through a grant given by the Center for International Private Enterprise (CIPE) -- one of four core grantees of the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) -- to Venezuela’s Center for the Dissemination of Economic Information (CEDICE), the Democratic Coordinator participated in a US-funded project that facilitated the creation of the recently unveiled Plan Consenso País. This plan is currently touted as the unifying platform of the Venezuelan opposition.
The project in question, “Building Consensus on a National Agenda” (also referred to herein as the CIPE-CEDICE project), appears to have received NED funding during a particularly polarized period, from September 1, 2002 through at least November 30, 2003.[4] This period starts a mere five months after the failed coup of April 2002, and includes the oil manager’s strike, which lasted from December 2002 to February 2003, that paralyzed the country and crippled its economy.
The organizations who participated in strategic planning for a national consensus building process include civil society groups, political parties, business associations and unions, which have been linked to the failed coup of 2002 and/or the subsequent failed oil manager’s strike of 2002-2003, as supporters, endorsers, or participants. These include, most notably: the Confederación de Trabajadores Venezolanos (CTV), Gente de Petroleo, Liderazgo y Vision, and Fedecamaras (the Venezuelan Chamber of Commerce).[5] Besides being funded by the United States under the rubric of the “Building Consensus on a National Agenda” project, the CTV[6], Liderazgo y Vision[7], and COPEI[8] have also received separate funding from the NED for other projects, either directly or via its core grantees.[9] The project’s Advisory Committee includes representatives from Fedecamaras and the CTV, among others.
Fedecamaras, Consecomercio and CEDICE are organizations which have representatives who signed the illegal “Carmona Decree” on April 12, 2002, by which Pedro Carmona Estanga, head of Fedecamaras, was installed as the country’s coup President. Each of these groups has played a key role in the project’s evaluation.[10] Significantly, the General Manager of CEDICE, Rocio Guijarro, who appears as a principal in the CIPE-CEDICE grant documents[11], signed the Decree,[12] which reads, in pertinent part:
“We hereby designate Pedro
Carmona Estanga…as President of the Republic of Venezuela…We hereby suspend the
Members of the National Assembly and their substitutes. …We hereby decree the
reorganization of public power to recover autonomy and independence…by
dissolving the illegitimately occupied offices of the president and all other
magistrates of the Supreme Tribunal of Justice, as well as the Attorney General
of the Republic, the Comptroller General of the Republic, the Ombudsman and the
members of the National Electoral Council.”[13]
“Building Consensus on a National Agenda” is a project that consists of meetings, consultations, regional workshops and national fora with selected organizations; it has, as its objective, the creation of a national policy agenda. The Democratic Coordinator’s Diego B. Urbaneja, cited in the grant documents as the head of the Democratic Coordinator’s “Country Consensus Commission (Comisión Consenso País)[14]” has vehemently denied that the national agenda announced July 9, 2004 by the Democratic Coordinator, Plan Consenso País —which the documents show to be fundamentally an electoral platform[15]-- is part of NED’s CIPE-CEDICE project. However, the evidence contradicts Mr. Urbaneja’s recent assertions.
One grant document states:
“The ‘Country Consensus Commission’ of the Democratic Coordinator, directed by Mr. Diego B. Urbaneja, has met several times with [the CIPE-CEDICE project manager] Professor Sabino to revise the work done through this project. This process led the Coordinator to adopt the consensus document as the basis for a transition agreement with the government in the event that a referendum on Chávez [sic] presidency takes place some time after August 19, 2003.”[16]
Timing is
Everything
After the failed coup
attempt in April 2002, Venezuela’s opposition engaged in an illegal, 64-day long
oil manager’s strike targeted at the removal of the Chávez government. The
strike, which took place between December 2002 and February 2003, crippled the
country’s economy, but failed in its ultimate objective of the Chávez
government’s ouster. Several fragments from the CIPE-CEDICE documents evidence
that not only did members of the groups
working on the US-funded project play leading roles in the illegal oil manager’s
strike and destabilization of the country’s economy, but that CIPE--which is
funded by NED--not only knew of their complicity, they continued to fund them
afterwards.
“In November 2002, …tensions
culminated in a general strike called by
key members of the [Democratic] Coordinator, including Fedecamaras, the key business association,
and CTV the key labor group. This
strike had a devastating effect on the Venezuelan economy and caused further
rupture in the relations between the government and the groups behind the
strike.”[17]
(bolded emphasis added)
“During the months of December
[2002] and January [2003] a crisis in Venezuela gave way to a national civic
strike called by the main organizations of the entrepreneurial and union sectors
and backed up by society, all of them
participants in the Democratic Coordinator…”[18]
(bolded emphasis added)
Because many of the
groups involved in the project were involved in the illegal oil manager’s
strike, CEDICE reported the following to CIPE in its 2nd Quarter
Report:
“The period of time that this
strike lasted prevented some project activities from taking place… among the
activities that could not take place are some of the meetings with the
entrepreneurial and union sectors and civilian organizations because they were involved in the conflict.”[19] (bolded emphasis added)
In the aftermath of the
failed oil strike it appears from the documents to have become clear, not only
to the Democratic Coordinator, but also to CIPE, that tactics to pursue a change
in government in Venezuela needed to shift from illegal, extra-constitutional
actions to a more constitutional framework - such as the Recall Referendum
guaranteed by Article 72 of the Venezuelan Constitution.
An April 15, 2003 report about the “Building Consensus on a National Agenda” project by CIPE to its Board of Directors describes the new framework. It reads:
“CIPE staff had telephone
discussions with CEDICE to get their comments on how the project could achieve
its objectives in Venezuela’s turbulent environment. They make a strong argument
for how the national agenda project is an important contribution to defining a
policy agenda not just for the private sector but for the Democratic Coordinator
itself…[M]any international analysts are critical of the Democratic Coordinator
for failing to come up with a policy agenda beyond the simple objective of
getting rid of Chávez. A well-defined and articulated agenda could provide…the
Democratic Coordinator with precisely
the platform it needs to bring about reform in Venezuela….The Democratic
Coordinator is now setting its sights on August 19 [2003] as the
constitutionally mandated date when a referendum on the Chávez [sic]
administration can begin to be organized.”[20] (bolded emphasis added)
As noted earlier, there were two significant extra-constitutional measures taken prior to the opposition’s tactical shift towards a legal referendum: the illegal coup of April 2002, and the illegal oil strike of December 2002 to February 2003. All three—the coup, the strike, and the referendum--shared the same objective: a change in government. The CEDICE grant report document for the period March-May 2003 refers to the timeline for the referendum as a guide for the project’s unfolding. It was clearly expected that the project would carry through November 19th, 2003, the earliest anticipated date for a referendum:
“The Referendum is not to be celebrated on August 19th [2003]; this is the date, 50% through Chávez’s ‘second’ term in office which started on August 19th 2003, from which the Referendum becomes legally possible…With these time lines the earliest possible date for a Referendum is November 19th [2003] with a presidential election to fill the remaining period of Chávez’s six year term…after that, should Chávez loose [sic] the Referendum. CEDICE’s consensus project is being monitored by the committee in the Coordinadora Democratica (Democratic Coordination [sic]) ‘Consensus Country [Consenso País]’ responsible for preparing a ‘transition program’ that will be offered to the electorate, and that is scheduled to be ready and approved by all elements of the Coordinadora by mid June.”[21] (bolded emphasis added)
“Consensus Country” (Consenso País, in Spanish), the name of the Democratic Coordinator’s Committee within the CIPE-CEDICE project “Building Consensus on a National Agenda,” interestingly shares the same name as the electoral platform, “Plan Consenso País,” unveiled by Mr. Urbaneja of the Democratic Coordinator on July 9th, 2004. Barely five weeks ahead of the August 15, 2004 referendum that will be held to decide—through electoral means, democratically and constitutionally-- the fate of the country’s leadership, the opposition has finally unveiled its platform, funded by the United States.
It is not clear whether funding for the
CIPE-CEDICE project was extended by CIPE beyond its stated end-date November 30,
2003. FOIA requests made by
independent investigators for all documentation of NED activities in Venezuela
are still underway. There have also been FOIA requests made for documents
regarding this project and others, currently ongoing in Venezuela, which have
not yet been released. It should not go unnoticed that funding for this specific project did
continue through the oil manager’s
strike; moreover, the project term was actually extended by CIPE
based on a request made by CEDICE to change the end date from August 31, 2003 to
November 30, 2003.[22]
November 19th, 2003 became an
important date in the opposition’s timeline for achieving its ultimate goal—the
ouster of President Chávez. This was seen to be the earliest date a recall
referendum could be held. Thus, the change in the CIPE-CEDICE project end date
may have been more significant than simply allowing for the completion of the
project after its interruption by a crippling, illegal
strike.
CIPE, in order to reinforce its own position vís a vís the goals of the Democratic Coordinator (who, via CEDICE, was a funding recipient), and within the framework of its ongoing funding for projects in Venezuela, reported to its board:
“The… referendum
is the next important target date for both the Democratic Coordinator to
solidify its support among the Venezuelan electorate for a change in
government and for the government of President Hugo Chávez to justify how it has
governed Venezuela since elected. If CEDICE and its partners are able to conduct
an effective public awareness campaign that gets the national agenda placed at
the center of the referendum…The Democratic Coordinator will need the national
agenda policy recommendations in order to redirect public opinion away from the
current Chávez policies…”[23] (bolded emphasis
added)
CIPE also reported that it would be working with CEDICE, and the Democratic Coordinator, to:
·
“Revise the strategy for developing the national…agenda so that it
focuses on having an impact on the August referendum
·
Develop a strategy for winning public support for this reform agenda
in advance of the referendum…
·
Monitor the legal process that is underway to establish the rules and
procedures for the referendum so that the strategy can be quickly adjusted to
maintain maximum impact
· Immediately inform CIPE staff of changes that occur in the referendum so that the project can be kept on track”[24]
As it stands today, the
referendum will be held on August 15, 2004. Throughout the referendum process,
the Democratic Coordinator has been repeatedly criticized by international
analysts—and indeed even its allies within Venezuela-- “for not developing sound alternative
policies to the Chávez agenda, uniting their members only under the single
objective of legally ousting Chávez from
power…”[25]
(bolded emphasis added)
As CIPE notes:
“The… projects that CEDICE is administering
[with CIPE funds] could significantly contribute to that effort…”[26]
CIPE, the core NED grantee, may indeed have had a clear target in its sights. The CIPE-CEDICE project appears to have led to Plan Consenso País, announced by the Democratic Coordinator on July 9th, 2004 as the opposition’s uniting electoral platform.
Considering that:
·
The timeline for this NED-funded project ran from September 2002,
mere months after the April 2002 coup, and through the illegal oil strike which
began in December 2002 and ended in February 2003, both of which failed in their
attempts at an extra-constitutional change in government;
·
Principals of organizations participating in the NED-funded project
were complicit in these polarizing and destabilizing events with CIPE’s
knowledge; and,
·
The grant period was extended through, at least, November 30, 2003,
encompassing the earliest date a legal referendum on the President’s mandate
could have been be carried out.
This
raises the question whether the “effort” referred to by CIPE in the above quote
is simply to the creation of a United States’ funded electoral platform by the
Venezuelan opposition, or whether the effort is the complete ouster of President
Hugo Chávez from office.[27] In either case, the use of NED monies
appears to be damning in its polarizing effects on the country, and in its
intent with respect to the democratically elected government headed by President
Hugo Chávez.
Venezuela Information Office
733 15th Street NW Suite
932
Washington, DC
20005
Voice: (202)
347-8081
Fax: (202)
347-8091
[1] United States Department of State, Office of Inspector General, “A Review of U.S. Policy Toward Venezuela: November 2001 - April 2002,” Report Number 02-OIG-003, July 2002, http://oig.state.gov/documents/organization/13682.pdf.
[2] NED Grant 2002-021, 2/1/02 – 9/30/03, CIPE Quarterly Report, April, May, June 2003; http://www.venezuelafoia.info
[3] CIPE Board of Directors Information Report on Programs in Venezuela, April 15, 2003
[4] NED Grant 2002-021, 2/1/02 – 9/30/03, CIPE Quarterly Report, April, May, June 2003
[5] Labor's Cold War, Tim Shorrock, The Nation, 5/19/03; The head of Fedecamaras, Pedro Carmona, was decreed the President of Venezuela during the failed coup (Proceedings of the Special Parliamentary Commission to Investigate the Events of April 11-14, 2002, National Assembly of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, May 2, 2002); Oscar Garcia Mendoza, Director of Liderazgo y Vision, appeared as a signer on an advertisement published in El Nacional on April 13, 2002, under the Heading CONAPRI, manifesting “unconditional support for the transitional government,”
[6] American Center for International Labor Solidarity, October 1, 2002-March 31, 2003
[7] National Endowment for Democracy Grant Agreement No. 2003-545.0
[8] International Republican Institute Quarterly Report, Grant Number 2002-02/7297, March 2002-March 2003
[9] NED Report to the US Department of State on Special Venezuela Funds, Grant Number S-LMAQM-02-H-0054, June 2002-September 2003.
[10] NED Grant 2002-021, 2/1/02 – 9/30/03, CIPE Quarterly Report, April, May, June 2003.
[11] CEDICE “ Consensus Building a National Agenda, Grant Agreement 0102522-000-00, 3rd Quarter report, March-May 31, 2003; CEDICE “Consensus Building a National Agenda”, Grant Agreement 0102522-000-0, 2nd Quarter Report, December 1, 2002-February 28, 2003
[12] Proceedings of the Special Parliamentary Commission to Investigate the Events of April 11-14, 2002, National Assembly of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, May 2, 2002. The signers of the actual decree document were: Pedro Carmona, Ignacio Cardenal Velazco (church), Luis Enrique Vaal (business), José Curiel (political parties), Rocío Guijarro (NGOs), Miguel Angel Martínez (media), Carlos Fernández (Fedecámaras), Luis Brazón (Consecomercio), Ignacio Salvatierra (National Banking Association), and Oswaldo Diaz. http://www.asambleanacional.gov.ve/ns2/discursos/interpelaciones/Pedro_Carmona_E.asp.; CEDICE “ Consensus Building a National Agenda, Grant Agreement 0102522-000-00, 3rd Quarter report, March-May 31, 2003
[13] The “Carmona Decree,” April 12, 2002, Miraflores Palace, Caracas, Venezuela
[14] This body also seems to be referred to, at times, as Comision Proyecto-Pais, CIPE Board of Directors Information Report on Programs in Venezuela, April 15, 2003
[15] CEDICE “ Consensus Building a National Agenda”, Grant Agreement 0102522-000-00, 3rd Quarter report, March-May 31, 2003
[16] NED Grant 2002-021, 2/1/02 – 9/30/03, CIPE Quarterly Report, April, May, June 2003.
[17] CIPE Board of Directors Information Report on Programs in Venezuela, April 15, 2003
[18] CEDICE “Consensus Building a National Agenda”, Grant Agreement 0102522-000-0, 2nd Quarter Report, December 1, 2002-February 28, 2003
[19]
Ibid.
[20] CIPE Board of Directors Information Report on Programs in Venezuela, April 15, 2003
[21] CEDICE “ Consensus Building a National Agenda, Grant Agreement 0102522-000-00, 3rd Quarter report, March-May 31, 2003
[22] NED Grant 2002-021, 2/1/02 – 9/30/03, CIPE Quarterly Report, April, May, June 2003.
[23] CIPE Board of Directors Information Report on Programs in Venezuela, April 15, 2003
[24] Ibid.
[25]
Ibid.
[26]
Ibid..
[27]
Ibid.