U.S. DRUG REPORT: A
POLITICAL WEAPON
Venezuela, Bolivia, and
the Fight Against Drugs
On September 16th 2008, less than a week
after Bolivian President Evo Morales declared US Ambassador Philip Goldberg
“persona non grata” on the grounds that he helped foment political divisions in
Bolivia,
the Bush White House released its annual list of Major
Drug Transit or Major Illicit Drug Producing Countries. For the first time, Bolivia was
designated as having “failed demonstrably” over the past year to combat drug
trafficking. According to the so-called “Majors List,” only Bolivia, Venezuela,
and Burma failed to meet their international obligations in the fight against
drugs, with Venezuela and Bolivia cited mainly for cocaine trafficking.
Venezuela has been on the Majors List for the last four years,
despite having achieved the fourth largest number of cocaine seizures of any
country in the world.[i] In early September, INTERPOL praised Venezuela
and the officials of its National Anti-Drug Agency for their capture of an
internationally wanted Colombian drug lord and his accomplice.[ii]
Bolivia has also earned the praise of the international
community in recent months. The United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime, in
its 2008 World Drug Report, notes that current coca cultivation in Bolivia
remains “well under annual totals during the early and mid 1990s.”[iii] Time Magazine
confirmed Bolivia’s
anti-drug success, pointing out that “coca cultivation is under control and
drug trafficking interdiction is up.”[iv]
Data cited by the UN demonstrates ongoing efforts by Bolivia and Venezuela to fight drug
trafficking, and directly contradicts the claim made by the White House that
these countries failed to meet international
standards. Experts have highlighted this discrepancy. “I’m not at all
surprised because the drug certification process has been so tainted and archly
politicized,” said Larry Birns, Executive Director of the Council on
Hemispheric Affairs in Washington,
DC.[v]
Indeed, the decision to blacklist Bolivia and Venezuela demonstrates the Bush
administration’s patent disregard for facts in its quest to demonize the
governments of these two countries. In addition, it calls into question the
wisdom of U.S.
drug policy, which sponsors failed eradication programs abroad while doing
little to reduce the huge demand for illicit drugs within its own borders.
HISTORICAL CONTEXT
Analyses of the question of drugs in Latin America too often pass over the historical context
of the region. In the Andes, the cultivation and
consumption of coca leaves dates back over 4,000 years to the pre-Columbian
civilizations. Coca leaves are chewed and used in spiritual and social
settings, as well as for medicinal purposes in herbal teas and poultices.[vi] Communities have continued to rely on this
traditional crop to help cope with the extreme environmental conditions in
which they live, particularly the high altitudes.
Given the legitimate
uses of the coca leaf and the historical importance of this plant in the Andean
region, the use of coca-bush eradication as the primary means to limit cocaine
production is misguided and ineffective. As part of its “War on Drugs,” the U.S. strongly promotes coca eradication in Colombia, Peru,
and Bolivia
– the three countries which produce the vast majority of the world’s cocaine.
In 2007, global potential cocaine production reached
994 metric tons (mt), with 600 mt, 60%
of total production, coming from Colombia,
followed by 290 mt from Peru,
and 104 mt from Bolivia.
Colombia, the country with the largest cocaine production in the world, saw a
27% increase in coca cultivation between 2006 and 2007, despite full
cooperation with the DEA through Plan Colombia, a counter-narcotics program in
which the U.S. has invested nearly $5 billion over eight years.[vii] Meanwhile, Peru
and Bolivia
saw much smaller increases in cultivation, just 4% and 5% respectively.[viii] Despite massive U.S.
spending on Plan Colombia,
the initiative has largely failed due to its emphasis on aerial spraying and
other ineffective eradication techniques. In 2007, coca eradication in Colombia
simply led to the crop being planted in other parts of the country.
BOLIVIA
President Evo Morales of Bolivia has in recent years
garnered media attention for advocating the legitimate uses of the coca leaf
and the right of farmers to grow the crop for traditional reasons. However, he
has not been the first Bolivian leader to do this. At a World Health
Organization Assembly in 1992, then President Paz Zamora noted that “coca is an
Andean tradition while cocaine is a Western habit.”[ix]
In 2006, after President Morales was elected, Bolivia
destroyed significantly more coca maceration pits and coca processing
laboratories (both used to create cocaine), than in previous years.[x] While the Bush administration accuses Bolivia of failing to fight drugs, the 2008 UN
World Drug Report makes clear that cocaine seizures are actually on the rise in
Bolivia.[xi] Seizures of cocaine in Bolivia
have risen from 14 tons in 2006 to 17 tons in 2007, meanwhile, Peru and Colombia conducted fewer seizures.[xii]
There has been a significant increase in targeted
coca eradication in Bolivia;
between 2006 and 2007, the amount of coca crops destroyed went from 12,528
acres to 15,491 acres.[xiii] Still, President Morales has promoted the
industrialization of legitimate coca-based products, such as tea, medicine,
shampoo, and cookies.
President Morales has
been successful in limiting coca crops grown for illicit use while permitting
limited cultivation for legitimate use in small 1600-square meter plots called catos. This policy has been successful
in large part due to the cooperation of coca growers. Elmerjildo Chávez, a coca
grower from the Yungas region, said, “we make sure no one is growing too much,
and that our coca is being sold to people who sell it for traditional uses and
not for cocaine.” By monitoring crop tallies and buyer licenses, coca grower
unions are able to limit how much of the plant is being produced, while making
sure that the coca leaves are sold for legitimate purposes.[xiv]
VENEZUELA
Quite different from the case of Bolivia is that of Venezuela,
a country that does not produce cocaine but is vulnerable to drug trafficking
because of its geographic positioning between the world’s largest producer – Colombia – and its largest consumer – the U.S.
In order to address these circumstances, Venezuela’s
counter-narcotics efforts have been aggressive, making it the country with the
fourth largest amount of cocaine seizures in the world. Meanwhile, the U.S.
Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) has made policing more difficult for Venezuela
by blocking the sale of chemical reagents needed to detect cocaine, heroin, and
amphetamines, and instead requiring the country to produce its own reagents for
drug enforcement.[xv]
The U.S.
has also complicated Venezuela’s
anti-drug efforts by imposing an embargo
on all military equipment containing U.S. parts. This measure has
blocked the sale of anti-narcotics vehicles including Spanish patrol boats and
Brazilian aircraft. Nonetheless, since 2005, when Venezuela ended full cooperation
with DEA agents allegedly involved in espionage, cocaine seizures have risen
from an average of 27.1 mt annually between 2002 and 2004 to an average of 43.2
mt per year between 2005 and 2007.[xvi]
In order to reduce cocaine smuggling in and out of
the country, the Venezuelan armed forces have detected and destroyed 223
illicit landing strips so far in 2008.[xvii] Furthermore, Venezuela is installing seven
Chinese-made radar stations throughout the country that will make it easier to
detect and stop planes carrying illicit drugs.[xviii]
THE UNITED STATES
The U.S. remains
the largest market for cocaine in the world. By UN estimates, 460 metric tons –
or 46% of all cocaine – was consumed in North American markets in 2006.[xix] U.S.-backed
coca eradication programs (namely aerial spraying) are largely perceived by
experts as ineffective, unfair. and discriminatory. This is because they fail
to reduce coca production while negatively affecting the health and welfare of
peasants, whose fields are sprayed regardless of whether or not they are
involved in the cocaine trade.
The State Department
already recognizes that the problem begins at home; the 2008 International
Narcotics Control Strategy Report states that “the
need for demand reduction is reflected in escalating drug use that takes a
devastating toll on health, welfare, safety, security, and economic stability
of all nations.”[xx] Furthermore,
a September 2008 Zogby poll found that 76% of likely voters in the U.S. believe
that the war on drugs is failing, with 19% arguing that reducing demand through
treatment and education is the single best way to handle the 'war on drugs.'[xxi]
With this in mind,
reducing the enormous demand for cocaine within U.S. borders should be made a priority.
Also, instead of funding ineffective and expensive crop eradication programs
with taxpayer dollars, the U.S. could take a leadership role in anti-narcotics
by funding programs to help countries better detect drugs at their own ports,
locate and destroy drug processing facilities, and halt money laundering by
drug traffickers.
CONCLUSION
The decision by the White House to label Venezuela and Bolivia as countries that “failed
demonstrably” to combat drugs is a politically motivated one that lacks factual
basis. Bolivia’s
success in fighting drug trafficking has been well documented by the media as
well as international agencies. Important in this struggle, though, has been
the search to avoid dismantling the traditional practices centered around the
coca plant in Bolivia.
Meanwhile, cocaine seizures have risen significantly
in Venezuela
over the past few years and authorities in that country have demonstrated their
commitment to the fight against drug trafficking through initiatives such as
the destruction of an unprecedented number of illicit airstrips.
In addition to these
efforts, leaders in Venezuela
and Bolivia
have called for much more significant measures to be taken to diminish the
demand for cocaine abroad. Both countries recognize that there must be a
dramatic decline in the demand for cocaine in order for any permanent
reductions in supply to be achieved. Instead of dedicating resources to
ineffective and unfair drug eradication policies in other countries, the U.S. would be
wise to increase efforts to reduce demand for cocaine and other illicit drugs
through increased drug education, prevention, and rehabilitation programs at
home.